


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CANZUK International

“The Open Sea”

The Case for Defence and Security Cooperation
between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom



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The Open Sea

Dr. Nigel Greenwood¹ and the Hon. John Greenwood RFD QC²

Given the complexity of the topic, this paper is presented in three parts, giving a layered narrative: The Idea (3.5 pages), giving a brief sketch why a CANZUK military alliance has merit for its own sake, and represents an urgent opportunity over the next six months as part of a wider Brexit strategy; A Deeper Dive (4 pages), providing more context; and Appendices, delving into relevant strategic background.

¹ Nigel Greenwood PhD is a former senior analyst in the Australian Government. A mathematician by training, he works in technology start-ups, on military and civilian applications of new forms of artificial intelligence. A political writer during the republican debate, he wrote *For the Sovereignty of the People*, Australian Academic Press (1999), arguing that Australia should remain a constitutional monarchy.

² The Hon. John Greenwood RFD QC is a retired constitutional, military and commercial lawyer. He has appeared before the Privy Council in London and Australia's High Court. A former Queensland parliamentarian and Cabinet Minister, he was a Queensland delegate to Australian Constitutional Conventions; also a former Army Reserve colonel (*ret'd*) and Reviewing Judge Advocate in the Australian Army Legal Corps. Former President, RUSI Queensland.

The Idea

The British people have now demonstrated Sir Winston Churchill's adage: given a choice between Europe and the open sea, they have voted for the open sea. But now as the United Kingdom confronts the realities of once again becoming a sovereign country, the more difficult question is posed: how is this to be navigated?

This is an essay outlining the imperatives of a coherent post-Brexit defence and security policy, that secures sovereign Britain's future by reclaiming an historical position within the Commonwealth of Nations, undoing the damage wrought by decades of misunderstanding and neglect, and using these processes to build confidence now in post-Brexit diplomacy, security, commerce and trade. One urgent objective is strengthening British defence and security; another is using these same processes to build tangible confidence in post-Brexit trade treaties.

The Treaty of Lisbon appears to forbid the UK from negotiating its own trade agreements until after Brexit, creating an uncertainty that some in Brussels appear determined to translate into lucrative despondency. However, Britain does seem to be able to negotiate its own military policy, and it's an interesting question the degree to which it is able to harmonise the handling of tax credits via bilateral tax treaties.³ The challenge addressed (at least in part) by this paper is outlining how a unfettered ability to negotiate military policy now might be put to use, both to improve a global military position and to put meat on the bones of an immediate post-Brexit multilateral commerce and trade agreement.

The opportunity can be found in a problem. When British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Jeremy Hunt declares that "Australia is one of the UK's closest allies"⁴ and Secretary of State for Defence Gavin Williamson CBE says of the UK and Australia that "...we [want] to make sure everyone around the world understands that these two great nations are the greatest of allies",⁵ these sentiments are to be warmly commended... but are, regrettably, only partially true. As outlined in this paper and its appendices, unfortunately the reality is more complicated.

The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are four of the five members of "Five Eyes", the world's most powerful intelligence-sharing alliance. (The fifth is, of course, the United States of America.) These four countries have a shared history: Canada, Australia and New Zealand have historically been the United Kingdom's oldest and closest allies, sharing its monarch and the constitutional and legal doctrines which direct parliamentary democracy in each of these four countries.

³ <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/tax-treaties>

⁴ <https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/2598-london-calling-as-aukmin-reaffirms-key-alliance>

⁵ The *Australian*, 21 July 2018.

And yet in 2018, despite multiple pragmatic arrangements there is no formal military alliance⁶ among the UK, Australia and New Zealand, while the only formal alliance between the UK and Canada is from the Cold War exigencies of NATO—which in the eyes of some observers might seem to place the UK-Canada relationship on much the same level as that of the UK with Germany, Italy, Turkey or France.

Regrettably it must also be said that the behaviour of some British governments in the 1960s and 1970s has done damage to relationships with these countries, especially with Australia and New Zealand, and to Britain's own international reputation on the wider global stage. This damage needs to be understood and remedied as part of post-Brexit diplomacy. It is not enough to persuade diplomats and politicians; Britain needs to win back the hearts and minds of the members of the general public of these countries, many of whom have been historically its closest and most loyal friends.

Britain's current formal military alliances do not reflect the reality of its modern global interests—interests created in part due to the legacy of past centuries. As part of once again becoming a sovereign country, the United Kingdom must look to its global alliances in an era that has seen a return to Great Power tensions with attempts by China, Iran and Russia to engage in various forms of empire-building, escalation of war in the Middle East and the rise of Islamist terrorism. At the same time the last presidential election demonstrated deep political fatigue within the American electorate and led to turbulent governance in Washington DC, while serious longer-term external challenges exist in climate change, minerals and energy availability and possibly mid-21st Century global food supply.

Military policy seldom stands apart from a broader strategic framework. A proposed formal military alliance among the CANZUK countries is consistent with a global economic and trade policy for the United Kingdom, and indeed should be regarded as one strand of a wider and deeper military, mercantile, political and diplomatic alliance. Given the potential crisis of Brexit, spare a moment to contemplate commerce and trade before reverting to matters military.

A Remainder criticism of Brexit is that Remainders add the markets represented by Canada, Australia, New Zealand and a handful of other markets and claim it to be less than the EU markets, hence represent an inferior position for the British economy. One can (and should) query these metrics, along with their underlying assumptions on the future of the Eurozone, but that's a debate for another article. The more urgent issue is that it displays a very Continental *naïveté* regarding global markets. It looks upon Europe as a walled garden, and imagines every other market as similarly a walled entity, each to be entered separately. In contrast, for Britain the CANZ countries aren't merely isolated markets. They are safe harbours across the open sea: places with which to trade and do business, but more than that, places in which it is safe to base business, as if the traders were in a version of the United Kingdom but geographically closer to the Asia-

⁶ As discussed in *§Appendix 2: The Trajectory Downwards*.

Pacific region and the Americas. These countries have a shared legal system, parliamentary democracies built on common principles, history and traditions and even a shared monarch with the United Kingdom. This also means they have shared military traditions, with operational implications (but more on that in a moment).

Managed correctly, trade agreements with the CANZ countries would be not additive, but multiplicative, involving not only access to these countries, but also to the rich multitude of other major economies with whom these countries already have bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements. Canada and Australia each have free trade agreements with the United States. Australia and New Zealand each have free trade agreements with China. They each also have a multitude of trade agreements with other key economies across the world. To enjoy this opportunity, the challenge is to enter into a CANZ alliance with suitable tax agreements that would enable British-headquartered companies to trade and operate freely within the CANZ countries, and reciprocally for companies from these countries within the UK and one another—a new form of commercial mobility, enabling the efficient flow of capital among these countries. This would probably involve appropriate tax-crediting, so each government continues to impose its sovereign will on issues such as company tax, but so that companies and revenue streams operating across CANZUK are encouraged, not handicapped. The elegance of this approach is that it would replace the need to negotiate a large number of trade agreements from scratch with a multitude of foreign governments, with doing trade-and-tax negotiations with exactly three sympathetic Commonwealth countries that already operate under forms of English common law and common practices in administration, accountancy and finance.

The EU is trying very hard to prevent Britain from negotiating free trade agreements, so that a hard Brexit appears disastrous. But managed properly, the post-Brexit UK could have rapid access to a multitude of global markets under highly favourable terms.

Why link the question of a formal military alliance with that of trade and taxation agreements?

- The first answer is as remarked, that military priorities and crucial trade agreements typically go hand-in-hand.
- The second answer is the fact that the UK is currently faced by an existential political crisis in trade, and the CANZ countries are faced by a severe crisis in defence, and these crises are interlinked, to a large extent soluble in a single transaction.
- Under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty it would seem that Britain cannot negotiate free trade agreements until Brexit has been completed. But if it can establish a formal CANZUK defence treaty, as part of a wider deal that includes suitable commercial preparations for Brexit (perhaps such as an appropriate multilateral tax treaty), then this will bring the UK four-fifths

of the way to the relevant free trade position, and build public confidence in the Brexit process.

- As outlined below, the Trump presidency, the decay of the global rules-based international order and a return to Great Power instability means that the UK, Canada and Australia have all independently had to commit to much larger-scale defence spending, although this will be slow to translate into results. But interoperability, combined with the certainties of a formal defence treaty, would deliver a much greater—and immediate—security benefit and defence synergy for Canada and Australia. Placed on the negotiating table by the UK, it would provide a strong incentive to ensure the other negotiations happen quickly, sweeten the overall deal, and inject strong confidence in positive outcomes.



A Deeper Dive

An overarching concern for all four CANZUK countries arises from some announcements by the Trump administration in the United States. President Trump sometimes appears to prefer autocrats over the prime ministers of the old English-speaking democracies; more amenable to cutting deals with Russia, China and North Korea than engaging in activities to support America's regional allies. He appears to view NATO in transactional terms, its future expressed more as a balance sheet rather than a balance of power. And the deeper risk is that President Trump is not a one-off phenomenon, circumscribed by term limits; it may be that he is instead a symptom of a measure of alienation of the American public from their commitments to lead the free world. If that is so, then President Trump may merely be the first enunciation of a shift across America's political spectrum. Assumptions about the US commitment to lead the free world that have held true since 1945 might attract a measure of doubt.

The UK has critical threats on three fronts: the intransigence of a European establishment determined to exact punishment for the Brexit referendum decision; some statements from the Trump administration, casting into doubt the terms of a post-Brexit FTA; and internally, restive groups in Scotland and Northern Ireland wondering if they can strike better deals with the EU directly.

Australia and New Zealand are confronted by an increasingly aggressive China, which is asserting claims over the South China Sea, buying influence in the Pacific and rapidly building offensive naval capabilities, including aircraft carriers and a large submarine fleet. And again the Trump administration poses problems, but mainly in the context of military policy: if China poses a threat to Australian or New Zealand interests, will the US administration reliably intervene, or might it be willing to ignore it? Despite a massive military acquisition programme by the current Australian Government, the reality is that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) continues to have capability gaps that require a larger ally to fill, while the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is tiny and suffering from decades of neglect, with its main surviving military capability being its regiment of SAS soldiers.

In the case of Canada the main threat is an increasingly aggressive Russia, a threat exacerbated both by Putin's adventurism and the prospect of climate change opening up both the North-West Passage and Arctic Ocean, creating both opportunities and threats. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), while substantial and boosted by new Canadian Government spending commitments,⁷ again like their Australian counterparts have significant capability gaps. Referring to a possible unreliability of the Trump administration, Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland gave a key foreign policy speech in June 2017 in the Canadian House of Commons, stating "Canadians need to spend billions on 'hard power' military capability because they can't rely on the U.S. or others for protection".⁸

⁷ https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2017/06/canada_unveils_newdefencepolicy.html

⁸ <https://globalnews.ca/news/3506043/foreign-policy-freeland-america-first-response/>

The brutal reality is, however, that building stand-alone capability is slow and expensive. Interoperability makes sense: while the British Armed Forces are far smaller in scale than their American counterparts, they remain one of the most significant military forces of the Western Alliance. The Royal Navy's *Queen Elizabeth*-class supercarriers and *Astute*- and *Vanguard*-class nuclear submarines (as well as the future *Dreadnought*-class nuclear submarines) provide complementary capabilities that the other Commonwealth navies completely lack, and which might prove crucial in a future crisis. More mundanely, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's logistical support vessels—replenishment ships and fast fleet tankers—may prove a vital resource. The RAF operates Eurofighter Typhoon fighters, with dogfight capabilities not possessed by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and is already looking forward to the Typhoon's replacement, the optionally-piloted Tempest 6th-Generation fighter.

Commonalities exist. There are actually three Special Air Service (SAS) formations in the world, with a shared history: as well as the British SAS corps, there are Australian and New Zealand regiments of SAS, with both shared and complementary skills. (The other long-standing Commonwealth SAS regiment, in Rhodesia, was disbanded when Rhodesia became Zimbabwe.) The RAF and RAAF both fly F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and are both members of its international supply chain, and the RCAF may either acquire F-35s or, alternatively, high-end 4th Generation fighters such as the Eurofighter Typhoon (but in the interim has a fighter capability gap, partially plugged by buying Australian ex-RAAF F/A-18s).

And the Commonwealth armed forces also have specialist capabilities, many of which the British Armed Forces don't possess. The RAAF is currently the only non-American force in the world permitted to fly the Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft (it has twelve), while the RAN's unique requirement for very long-range conventional submarines is (eventually) leading to the construction of the *Shortfin Barracuda*-class submarine, a conventionally-powered variant of the new French nuclear-powered *Barracuda*.⁹ In the interim the RAN and RCN operate conventional *Collins*-class and *Victoria*-class submarines, leading to calls for their closer cooperation:¹⁰ the US Navy places a high value on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training with these submarines. The rising threat of Chinese submarines in the Asia-Pacific has, for the last five years, also led to calls for much closer RCN-RAN cooperation;¹¹ it also appears to have led to the Australian Government's recent (June 2018) decision to buy British BAE Systems' Global Combat Ship (as the RAN *Hunter*-class frigate, equipped with Australian CEA Phased-Array Radar and the US Navy's Aegis

⁹ Although nuclear-powered submarines are in most respects superior to their conventional counterparts, they do have one flaw: it is typically impossible to switch off the nuclear power plant completely, so "silent running" means noise-reduced rather than actually silent. In contrast a conventional submarine can completely switch off its power plant, so silent running means being actually silent in the water, with obvious stealth advantages against passive sonar.

¹⁰ <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/canadas-submarines-opportunities-for-cooperation-with-australia/>

¹¹ <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/asia-pacific-challenges-and-the-logic-of-aus-can-cooperation/>

combat management system).¹² Canada traditionally has one of the best ASW capabilities within NATO, while RCN and RAN warships are fitted with Aegis area air-defence capabilities.¹³

Canada, Australia and New Zealand are members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangements that historically arose out of the United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (UKUSA) in 1946, and as such have a raft of associated agreements that include the UK, involving signals intelligence, general intelligence, military-relevant science and technology and force inter-operability.

And yet there is no formal military alliance between the UK and Australia or New Zealand, while the only formal alliance between the UK and Canada is through NATO. The Five Power Defence Arrangements do not represent a formal alliance.¹⁴ In the name of Europe, the Wilson and Heath governments in the 1960s and 1970s went out of their way to destroy in public view the previous assumptions of inherent alliance based on kinship and history.¹⁵ The 1982 Falklands War marked the beginning of a renaissance between the UK and Australia, during the Thatcher and Hawke governments.¹⁶ Yet the continued absence of anything tangible enabled the Keating government in mid-1990s Australia once again to exploit the residual public bitterness at the behaviour of the earlier British governments, creating a clear distinction between the foreign policies of Paul Keating and his predecessor, Bob Hawke. Even the relatively recent establishment of highly desirable arrangements such as AUKMIN have been vulnerable to criticism, in that they cast into harsh relief Britain's chronic neglect of the prior relationship—not helped by the fact that AUKMIN is modelled on the existing AUSMIN arrangements, the Australian-US senior ministerial meetings.

In stark contrast a formal alliance exists between Australia and the United States via the ANZUS pact, a more vague form of which also still seems to apply to New Zealand despite its ban on nuclear-armed warships. Since the late 1960s the United States has actively and openly cultivated relationships with strategic Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Singapore.

Why in the 21st Century would the United Kingdom want to have a formal military alliance with Australia and New Zealand, and have this an alliance shared with Canada, distinct from NATO? A multitude of reasons exist: history; kinship; shared institutions and governance; trade (as safe harbours and as markets); common military doctrines; access to strategic locations (CANZ literally as safe harbours, as bases to access globally-strategic choke points and hot spots, and as countries with shared longer-term geographical interests in new regions of international conflict); access to reserves of commodities likely to prove strategic across the 21st Century (oil, coal & natural gas; nuclear energy,

¹² <http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/future/ffg>

¹³ <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-royal-canadian-navy-in-the-pacific-a-look-at-capabilities/>

¹⁴ As discussed in §Appendix 2: *The Trajectory Downwards*.

¹⁵ As discussed in §Appendix 2: *The Trajectory Downwards*.

¹⁶ As discussed in §Appendix 3: *The Trajectory Turns Upwards* and §Appendix 4: *A New Commonwealth Relationship*.

and food); and more general global positioning (diversification of global assets in cyber-warfare and counter-terrorism, location of space bases and testing ranges, and access to other strategic emerging technologies).

Each of these reasons has deeper complexities, outlined in greater depth in Appendix 1.¹⁷ Their summed conclusion is that a CANZUK formal alliance is urgently in the British national interest. In the late 20th Century Britain committed its resources to NATO as an alliance dedicated to protecting the interests and survival of the North Atlantic democratic community during the Cold War. In the 21st Century, while NATO remains important, a more urgent alliance is needed to defend Britain's own global interests, and the most durable way to achieve this is via the CANZUK democratic community.

It was remarked earlier that the UK has critical threats on three fronts: the intransigence of a European establishment determined to exact punishment for the Brexit referendum decision; a capricious Trump administration casting into doubt the terms of a post-Brexit FTA; and internally, restive groups in Scotland and Northern Ireland wondering if they can strike better deals with the EU directly. Establishing a CANZUK military alliance will:

- Demonstrate to British voters that constructive movement is happening for life beyond Brexit, rather than the government simply being mired in the Brexit controversies themselves.
- Create confidence in post-Brexit treaties, especially with countries that themselves have existing FTAs with America. Although the Canadian relationship with the US under President Trump has hit turbulence, the US-Australian strategic relationship is such that it is unlikely the US-Australian FTA would be imperilled any time soon.
- Weaken attempts by Brussels to run pre-Brexit spoilers on future UK FTAs. Remember that as of May 2018, the EU has approved¹⁸ beginning FTA negotiations with both Australia and New Zealand. It can safely be assumed that Brussels is attempting to engage in various unscrupulous tactics to wreck UK negotiations with both countries if it can: M. Barnier has made no secret¹⁹ of the importance of “punishing” the UK for exercising a sovereign will to leave. (Given the inherent incompatibility of the agriculture policies of the EU with those of Australia and New Zealand—Australia and New Zealand practice agriculture on a scale and productive efficiency that are anathema to the French rural archetype of Gaston and his three heavily-subsidised cows—it is tempting to wonder

¹⁷ See *Appendix 1: Let Me Count the Ways—Modern Reasons for a Formal Military Alliance*.

¹⁸ <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/eu-approves-free-trade-negotiations-with-australia-and-nz> ; <http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aeufta/Pages/default.aspx>

¹⁹ <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/02/15/michel-barnier-forced-apologise-inappropriate-brexit-punishment/>; <https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/03/back-off-barnier-you-dont-need-to-invent-obstacles-to-brexit/>; <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-will-use-sanctions-to-punish-you-during-brexit-transition-says-brussels-vfwcfswdc> ; <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/24/brexit-many-in-europe-wish-to-punish-the-uk-for-leaving-the-eu-says-luxembourg-finance-minister.html>

whether these negotiations are actually intended to have any future from the European perspective, other than isolating Britain and achieving economic damage by distracting Canberra and Wellington with the alluring bait of a European deal during the Brexit process.)

The specific structure this defence alliance should take is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a few features are obvious:

- At a strategic level the alliance needs to adopt, as a fundamental premise, a NATO-style principle of mutual defence—an attack on one member of CANZUK is an attack on all. This is the principle that, before the Wilson/Heath/Wilson years, was regarded as so obvious among the CANZUK countries that it didn't need formal declaration, but the events of these years and subsequent decades have intervened to make it necessary.
- At a practical level, its crux is interoperability of resources: people, equipment, assets and ports/bases. Some forms of interoperability will take longer to achieve than others.
- What form might the British side of things take? In a speech to the Royal United Services Institute in London in 2012, British Chief of Defence Staff General Sir David Richards outlined the possible development of “adaptable brigades to sustain enduring operations and routinely develop partnerships and knowledge around the world”, including a brigade for the Indian Ocean and South East Asia.²⁰

Richard's speech was greeted with enthusiasm in Australia, in particular his desire for “much greater involvement in the [Five Power Defence Arrangements]”.²¹ As noted in 2013 by Peter Jennings, the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute,

“The fact is that defence cooperation between the UK and Australia is limited and at risk of shrinking further... But it doesn't have to be this way. At the coming AUKMIN meeting, Ministers should challenge their officials to develop a program of more active defence and security cooperation. It's in the UK's interests to do so because boosting their defence engagement in Asia will add credibility to their efforts to increase their diplomatic presence here. The region is looking for strategic not just trading partners. It's in Australia's interests to do more with the UK to show that our strategic engagement isn't just limited to a handful of Asia's emerging powers.”²²

- In Australia, much of the groundwork for hosting allied forces was laid during the Obama era, when it looked like US forces would sustain an enhanced Australian presence as part of Obama's much-vaunted “pivot to Asia”. And in 2018 a paper published by Washington's Centre for Strategic and International Studies called for US nuclear attack submarines and US

²⁰ Re-quoted from <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukmin-awkward-anglos/>

²¹ <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukmin-awkward-anglos/>

²² <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukmin-awkward-anglos/>

Navy warships to be based in Perth, Western Australia, in response to China's growing aggression in the Indo-Pacific.²³ Under President Trump the likelihood of this, like so much other policy, is uncertain. But it creates a space for Royal Navy nuclear submarines and surface vessels.

- The alliance could also be used as the framework to enhance cooperation and technology sharing in ways not well served by current arrangements: for example, The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) does not appear an effective way to coordinate technology developed by private technology start-ups in any of the CANZUK countries. A trans-national DARPA-style entity might work better.

Britain invested centuries of work, wealth and blood in building a global community... and then allowed relationships with this community to stagnate for over a third of a century in the name of Europe. Now in the name of the United Kingdom it needs to repair the damage and renew its place in the wider world. A formal military alliance is a good place to start.

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²³ <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/washington-report-floats-us-nuclear-attack-subs-and-warships-in-perth/news-story/af5d0e9dd300c8eb96bf74aca790198d>

§Appendix 1: Let Me Count the Ways - Modern Reasons for a Formal CANZUK Military Alliance

- **History:** As argued in detail in the further Appendices,²⁴ the legacy of two world wars has demonstrated that Australia, New Zealand and modern Canada (including Newfoundland) are the United Kingdom's closest and most reliable friends in times of war; this was confirmed even after the anger provoked by Britain's abandonment of traditional friendships, trading markets and military commitments, when during the Falklands War Australia and New Zealand did far more to help the British cause than Britain's European "friends and partners", including its NATO allies. And the only NATO ally that was staunchly on side was Canada; even the United States required considerable lobbying. (The fact the US required the degree of lobbying it did, on a question as simple as "Should a community dwelling on the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, that strongly identifies as British, that has been British since 1833, and has been invaded militarily by a foreign power, be restored to its *ante bellum* condition?" must raise serious concerns for future crises.)
- **Kinship:** Modern Canada, Australia and New Zealand are all culturally diverse, multi-ethnic countries. And yet Australia still traditionally has the most British residents in the world outside the United Kingdom—by a large margin—with Canada and New Zealand also in the top-ten global locations for the British diaspora.²⁵ Formal alliance or not, the reality is that if any of these countries were to be plunged into war, a strong political pressure would exist for the British Government to support them. (On a milder note, even the so-called 1995 "Turbot War" between Canada and Spain emphasised this point, with the fishing fleets of Cornwall and Devon declaring themselves Canadian and setting to sea flying the Maple Leaf flag, forcing the agenda in Westminster and Whitehall. Spain was alarmed at the possibility of global escalation of the diplomatic rift to the other Commonwealth realms, showing that they appreciated the strength of the Commonwealth links.²⁶) Given that the burden of support can be expected to exist in times of war, surely the benefits of being seen to be willing to give support should be enjoyed in times of peace?
- **Shared Institutions and Governance:** The CANZ countries have a shared legal system, parliamentary democracies built on common principles, history and traditions and even a shared monarch with the

²⁴ See §Appendix 2: *The Trajectory Downwards* and §Appendix 3: *The Trajectory Turns Upwards*.

²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_diaspora; more recently, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/tradewithUK/Interim_Report/section?id=committees%2Freportjnt%2F024101%2F25066#footnote5target

²⁶ To see how the Turbot War played out across the British political spectrum see the *Guardian*, 29 March 1995; *The Times*, 18 April 1995, also 17th, 14th, 12th and 7th April, 16th and 14th March 1995; the *Daily Telegraph*, 13th and 15th March 1995; the *Observer*, 12th March 1995 and the *Sunday Telegraph*, 12th March 1995.

United Kingdom. They are repeatedly voted²⁷ as being among the best-governed and least-corrupt countries in the world, in stark contrast with many of the EU countries. If one is to have allies, it is good to have some that govern in familiar ways and do it well.

- **Trade (as Safe Harbours and as Markets):**
 - As a consequence of these shared institutions and governance, the CANZ countries are not merely potential markets, but safe harbours across the open seas. This would be true even without engaging in post-Brexit trade agreements. (Indeed, if reports of British Prime Ministers’ “Letters of Last Resort” are true,²⁸ Australia is already quietly regarded as one of the safest of harbours, despite the absence of a formal alliance.) But if a defence alliance and suitable tax agreements were created as envisaged in this paper, then these safe harbours would become critical enablers for global British trade rather than mere markets.
 - The extent of future post-Brexit trade between the UK and the CANZ countries is difficult to estimate, for two reasons:
 - First, due to what analysts call “The Rotterdam Effect”: most of British trade destined for the wider world is first shipped to Rotterdam before being shipped onwards, inflating the apparent ratio of trade to Europe compared with the rest of the world.
 - EU subsidies distort the patterns of trade that would exist in their absence. Thus, for example, Australian trade to the UK severely declined after the UK’s entry to the EEC in 1973, and “Exports of Australian wine, beef, sugar, rice and dairy goods to the EU (and thus to the UK) are severely curtailed by strictly enforced EU quotas and tariffs giving preference to European suppliers”.²⁹ Despite this, trade between the UK and CANZ countries remains significant and would logically be expected to grow in the absence of European barriers.
- **Common Military Doctrines:** The British Armed Forces uphold the world’s best practice for having their rules of engagement comply with the laws pertaining to war (*jus in bello*). Their standards are famously higher than those of some of their NATO allies, but they are not alone.

²⁷ https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017;
<https://www.prosperity.com/rankings>

²⁸ See §Appendix 2: *The Trajectory Downwards*.

²⁹ https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/tradewithUK/Interim_Report/section?id=committees%2Freportjnt%2F024101%2F25066#footnote5target

- It is sometimes forgotten that the British rules of military compliance with the laws of war—and the law more generally—have their genesis from the Crown in the Westminster system: specifically, the doctrines in English law of the ancient version of ministerial responsibility, that state in part that “...kings [of England/Great Britain/the United Kingdom] cannot command ill or unlawful things. And whatever ill events succeed, the executioners of such designs must answer for them”.³⁰ This is a central part of the post-Cromwell military tradition of putting the emblem of the Crown and the Royal Cipher (“EIIR”) on British uniforms—as a warning to members of the Armed Forces of obedience to this legal doctrine as members of “Her Majesty’s Armed Forces”.
- It remains relevant to this day. Again it is often forgotten by civil servants and politicians that as a result of this, unlawful orders do not possess the authority within the British Armed Forces that they do within, say, the US Armed Forces, because unlike in the US Armed Forces, manifestly unlawful orders cannot and do not have the authority of the military hierarchy, as they cannot come from the Crown. The profoundly democratic nature of modern political authority, imposed by the modern form of ministerial responsibility, is built on top of this ancient plumbing and wiring that constrains military obedience of all ranks to the law via the Crown. As then-Brigadier (later Major General) Sir Victor Windeyer KC commented in his 1930s law lectures, as a consequence “Every civil servant should remember that, while it is the duty of servants of the government to carry out all lawful orders, it is equally their duty to disobey unlawful orders”.³¹
- We note in passing that this constraint cannot be reproduced in a republic, which is why the US Constitution fails to achieve it, instead relying wholly on the formal prescription that all servants of the Executive must obey the law. In the absence of the legal framework surrounding the Crown this prescription is ineffective and was called out as such during the original drafting of the US Constitution in Philadelphia.³² Across the 20th Century its ineffectual nature was repeatedly demonstrated, underlined by Congressional investigations into Tea Pot Dome and Watergate (and subsequently Iran-Contra), prompting the editor of Washington’s Congressional Quarterly to ask in despair if this showed “...some awful new flaw in the constitutional structure [of

³⁰ For discussion see Greenwood, N.J.C., *For the Sovereignty of the People*, Australian Academic Press (1999) pp.49-63, quoting Sir Dudley Digges’ 1626 impeachment speech before the House of Lords. Legal historians regard this speech as the genesis for the ancient form of ministerial responsibility after the Restoration in 1660; the modern form later evolved on top of this.

³¹ Greenwood *op. cit.* p.49

³² Greenwood, *op. cit.* pp.364-366.

the US Constitution]?”³³ Similarly we would point to the executive lawlessness from the late 1950s to 1970s of the armed forces of France, Spain, Greece and Portugal.³⁴

- The British Armed Forces are not alone in their high standards in conforming to international law in the conduct of war, because other Commonwealth realms, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, share them as a consequence of their shared constitutional birthright, including the formal allegiance of the armed forces to the Crowns of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Windeyer, for example, was an army Brigadier in the Second Australian Imperial Force, fighting against Rommel’s Afrika Korps in North Africa during World War Two. After the War he became a Justice of the High Court of Australia.
- A stark problem exists for all of these armed forces, when fighting alongside allies that do not share these standards. During the Vietnam War the Australian and New Zealand forces strongly disapproved of the tactics and rules of engagement of their American counterparts. Many of the Commonwealth officers and senior NCOs were veterans of the Malayan Emergency and *Konfrontasi*; some were veterans of the fighting against the Japanese in World War II. They were aware that wars fought in the jungles of South-East Asia were winnable if fought by highly trained troops using appropriate rules of engagement that did not alienate the local communities, and did not regard the American forms of warfare as appropriate for that objective. As an Australian Government website tactfully states,

“...Australia’s Chief of Army, Lieutenant General [Sir] John Wilton, was keen both to field a force that could operate independently of United States forces, and to provide additional troops in support of the fight against the Viet Cong. Wilton believed that deploying an Australian task force would achieve both these aims as well as allowing Australian soldiers to fight the war according to their own doctrine and techniques.”³⁵

The Australian Government agreed and enlarged the military commitment to a Task Force, which took control of Phuoc Tuy Province and waged war there according to its own “doctrine and techniques”, despite being under ultimate American command.

- Anecdotally it has been suggested that the Australian experience in Vietnam has proved strongly influential in modern British military planning for the Gulf Wars and Afghanistan, sending contingents large enough to enable appropriate province-scale deployment,

³³ Greenwood, *op. cit.* pp.70-71.

³⁴ Greenwood, *op. cit.*, pp.91-207.

³⁵ <http://anzacportal.dva.gov.au>, “Phuoc Tuy Province”.

and hence waging war in accordance with British military doctrine rather than using the American approach.

- A formal alliance among the CANZUK countries would make easier the cooperation and inter-operability of like-minded military forces, reducing the dependence on allies whose military doctrines may at times be incompatible with our own.
- **Strategic Locations:**
 - **Safe Harbours:** The CANZ countries literally represent safe harbours on or near the Indian, South Pacific, North Pacific, North Atlantic, Arctic and Southern Oceans, and the Beaufort, Labrador, Timor, Arafura and Coral Seas. As such they represent an extraordinary expanse of friendly territory from which to base or re-supply naval or air force assets, to maintain a watching brief on potential strategic problems that may threaten British global interests: the choke points and hot spots below.
 - **Choke Points and Hot Spots:**
 - The South China Sea is an obvious source of global tension, which may erupt into war. Alternatively, President Trump or his successors may lose sufficient strategic interest or focus to prevent China—in the absence of other significant Western naval presence— from turning the South China Sea into a pool dominated by Chinese military forces, endangering global trade.
 - The Strait of Malacca, which runs between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, is a notorious potential “choke point” for global trade. Its strategic value has led it to be dubbed “the world’s most important trade route”.³⁶ Shipping through the Strait is potentially vulnerable to anti-shipping missile attack by non-national entities. At the 1997 RUSI Whitehall conference on the global threat posed by missile proliferation³⁷ it was noted that crude but effective anti-shipping cruise missiles could be constructed privately using readily-accessible components, including 1950s-era engines, over-the-counter GPS units and subsystems scavenged from mobile phones, at a then-cost per missile of less than \$200,000. (This was independently demonstrated by a private group of New Zealand engineers, who over a decade ago successfully built a basic cruise missile in a garden shed, posting their work to the Internet until requested by the US and New Zealand governments to

³⁶ <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/05/world-most-important-trade-route/>

³⁷ Conference notes, *Extended Air Defence and the Long-Range Missile Threat*, Royal United Services Institute, London (1997).

cease and desist.) The potential sophistication of such home-made cruise missiles can be assumed to be considerably greater today, not least due to the increased sophistication of modern mobile phones as an on-board computing platform. Given the vulnerability of Indonesia and Malaysia to non-national Islamist fundamentalism, this is a cause for concern, especially if one or more governments eventually also succumb to fundamentalism.

- The Indian Ocean is a rising region of tension between China and India, with China establishing a naval base in Djibouti, forcing a 99-year lease on the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota (particularly strategic, given the volume of international shipping in the nearby sea lanes), and making diplomatic inroads on the increasingly-indebted Maldives³⁸ (whose former president claims China has already taken over sixteen islands and is likely to seize more as a form of debt repayment³⁹).
- The Arctic Ocean and the newly emerging North West Passage offer challenges to Canada and its allies, now the impacts of climate change are beginning to manifest. One threat is from Russian ambitions over exploitable oil, natural gas and minerals in the sea bed, to replace the terrestrial Russian Arctic mineral reserves that are soon to be (or have already been) exhausted,⁴⁰ with potential for maritime border disputes over strategic lodes. Another, dispute is the attempt to re-classify the emerging North West Passage as international waters, a controversy in which the United States is most definitely not behaving as a friend, and one in which Canada's other closest allies may have a strategic interest in upholding the Canadian right to bar passage to hostile vessels. A third threat is China's recently publicly declared ambition to become an "Arctic Power", an ambition it is already spending heavily to achieve. This includes scenarios where Greenland achieves the stated aim of some of its politicians, of independence from Denmark, and then finds itself economically indebted to China in a re-run of Sri Lanka, the Maldives *et al.*⁴¹ These three controversies are linked: apart from the prospect of

³⁸ <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/sri-lanka-formally-hands-over-hambantota-port-to-chinese-firms-on-99-year-lease/>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html>; <https://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/maldives-faceoff-chinas-belt-and-road-expansion-tests-indias-resolve-20180222-h0whk4>

³⁹ <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Maldives-faces-Chinese-land-grab-over-unpayable-debts-ex-leader-warns>; <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Maldives-unrest-shapes-into-proxy-fight-for-China-and-India>

⁴⁰ <http://www.arctic-search.com/Arctic+Mineral+Resources>

⁴¹ <https://www.economist.com/china/2018/04/14/china-wants-to-be-a-polar-power>

exploiting rich Arctic fisheries in a food-depleted world (see below), and the minerals also being hungrily viewed by Russia, the United States Geological Survey estimates “the region could hold a quarter of the world’s as-yet-undiscovered hydrocarbons”.⁴² So America’s bid to re-define the North West Passage as international waters could be exploited unscrupulously as a precedent, by it and others, to strip-mine the previously-Canadian fisheries and seabed. This is a scenario where a future “transactional” US President in the style of Donald Trump might withhold support to Canada for any confrontation with Russia or China, or else supply it contingent upon very expensive long-term concessions.

- The North West Passage scenario is simply an archetype of a wider class of 21st Century problem. If US presidents continue to behave like President Trump, then either the rules-based international order (that Britain introduced in the 18th Century and which has survived until now through the collective efforts of Britain, its Commonwealth and the United States) may be permitted to decline through neglect and/or have the ambiguities of international law exploited unscrupulously—the “fake news” post-modern attitude writ large. In this the United States may become an actively destructive party—as in the North West Passage dispute—or be “transactional”, in extracting expensive and undesirable concessions before agreeing to uphold the rule-based order, or revert to isolationism and be willing to allow the entire system to collapse, preferring instead to rely on US military force to uphold specific American interests on a case-by-case basis. This is a global crisis that directly affects all the CANZUK countries.
- This class of problem directly affects the United Kingdom. Many of its remaining Overseas Territories have been retained because they are strategic, and some possess rich fisheries and mineral resources. For example, the potential for blockade or destruction of the Panama Canal has been suggested as one motive for China’s suggested “Silk Road on Ice”, exploiting climate change effects on the Arctic Ocean to provide an alternative sea route to Europe.⁴³ It is worth noting that the Panama Canal would be relatively easy for a non-national actor such as Al Qa’ida or Islamic State to disrupt, effectively destroying it as a route. For example, one or more hijacked supertankers, carrying one or more radiological weapons—themselves easy for terrorist organisations to construct, and, using suitable

⁴² <https://www.economist.com/china/2018/04/14/china-wants-to-be-a-polar-power>

⁴³ <https://www.economist.com/china/2018/04/14/china-wants-to-be-a-polar-power>

radioisotopes, an effective means of making repair of the blocked canal extremely difficult—could make the canal unusable for decades. Under that scenario the Falkland Islands would again become strategic real estate close to busy sea lanes; real estate with rich fisheries and oil and natural gas reserves. It is worth noting China has been courting Argentina and wider Latin America: in March 2018 it built a new deep space facility in Patagonia,⁴⁴ provoking unease in the United States.

- **Longer-term strategic interests:** Due to global warming Russia, China, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and the United States are already scrambling to renew their claims (or in China's case, stake new claims) on the Arctic, its minerals and fishing rights. In another couple of decades it will be Antarctica's turn.
 - Antarctica's current protection under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty will not outlive the decay of the rules-based international order, so it is expected to be the subject of an unprincipled land-grab as soon as this becomes feasible. For the first time since the 19th Century an entire continent is likely to be colonised aggressively, due to its pristine mineral and relatively-intact fisheries resources in a resource-depleted world. Already China has signalled its disdain for the Treaty.⁴⁵
 - The countries with the best prior claim to Antarctica are those that first explored and mapped it in the 19th and early 20th Centuries—the United Kingdom, Norway, France, Australia and New Zealand, whose claims are noted in the Antarctic Treaty and mutually recognised by one another. Other countries who came late to the party have nonetheless asserted opportunistic claims, namely Argentina and Chile, or reserved the right to make such claims, namely the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. The Argentine and Chilean claims, if upheld, would almost entirely negate the prior British territorial claim.
 - The vast majority of Antarctic territory demarcated under the mutually-recognised prior claims is claimed by Australia, while the UK and New Zealand also have significant claims. It would be logical for these three countries to cooperate extremely closely on their defence of their claims, while also cooperating closely with Norway and France. This would also shore up British claims on the Falkland, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

⁴⁴ <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/world/americas/china-latin-america.html>

⁴⁵ <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinas-expanding-interests-antarctica>

- Note that the point of such cooperation is not necessarily to exploit either the mineral or ecological wealth of Antarctica, but to decide how it is to be managed responsibly. Arguably the best management of the Antarctic fisheries would be to leave them as pristine as possible. But given China's reported existing (undeclared) military and mineral exploration activities in Antarctica⁴⁶—in apparent breach of the existing Treaty—and China's and Russia's aggressive stance on Antarctic fisheries,⁴⁷ coupled with recognition by the United States Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments that Antarctica is militarily significant and a region of future "Great Power" competition,⁴⁸ a CANZUK defence alliance must address the relevance of Antarctica to national interests, just as it should the Arctic.⁴⁹
- **Strategic Reserves:** The CANZ countries are not only markets and safe harbours, they are also possessors of strategic supply capabilities that may prove critical in the 21st Century.
 - **Oil, Coal & Natural Gas:** As deeply unfashionable as it is to admit, industrial societies will continue to be dependent upon oil, coal and natural gas across the 21st Century, despite the march of renewables.
 - In this respect scenario-based projections by agencies such as the International Energy Agency⁵⁰ need to be recognised as idealistic. Experience⁵¹ indicates that in reality, the most likely scenarios involve failure of the Paris Agreement to achieve abatement much beyond business-as-usual. This, coupled with the attempts by both China and India to achieve large-scale energy-intensive transformations within their societies across the next decades, suggest that oil and coal will continue to play important roles in the global economy.⁵² The utility of natural gas, both as an efficient fuel source and as feedstock for crop fertiliser, can be expected to grow.

⁴⁶ <https://www.news.com.au/technology/environment/conservation/should-we-be-concerned-about-a-challenge-to-australias-territorial-claim-in-antarctica/news-story/ad27325554ff70b7b0a0e7c5e1312c3a>; <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinas-expanding-interests-antarctica>

⁴⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/07/antarctica-ross-sea-sanctuary-marine-life-russia-china-fishing>

⁴⁸ https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6303-Securing_the_Frontier_WEB.pdf

⁴⁹ Note that Argentina and Chile both already openly declare their ongoing national postures regarding Antarctica, so this is hardly novel.

⁵⁰ https://www.iea.org/media/weowebiste/2017/Chap1_WEO2017.pdf

⁵¹ One of the authors is a former senior analyst in the Australian Government's former Department of Climate Change, in the Economic Analysis and Projections Team.

⁵² It is worth contrasting the scenario projections of the IEA with those of the US Energy Information Administration, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36752>

- Looking at mid-century scenarios of high fossil-fuel costs and demand, it is worth remembering that Australia and Canada have globally significant wet shale gas and tight oil reserves.⁵³ Australia is the world's largest exporter of high-quality black coal, while Canada has the largest known reservoirs of extremely heavy crude oil in the world.
- **Nuclear energy:** Given the likely mid-century world energy outlook, it is strongly possible that some form of nuclear energy will return in demand for industrial societies; for nuclear submarines it will always be in demand. Both Canada and Australia are in the top-3 uranium-producing countries in the world.⁵⁴ Australia has the largest and Canada the fourth-largest known uranium reserves in the world. (Second and third in the list are Kazakhstan and Russia, respectively.)⁵⁵ Looking ahead to future nuclear technologies, Australia and Canada are third and fourth in the world's known thorium reserves.⁵⁶
- **Food:** A significant risk exists for global food shortages by mid-century.
 - An authoritative scientific study⁵⁷ published in *Science* in 2006 predicts the worldwide collapse of fisheries by 2050 if existing overfishing practices continue. Similarly a 2011 study⁵⁸ published in the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States* has pointed to an unexpected pattern of collapse in smaller-scale fisheries occurring already. If the large-scale collapse occurs, this can be expected to cause a global disruption in food supply. (It is why the future economic value of viable fisheries is a repeated theme in this paper.)
 - Already tensions are rising. As remarked in a 1997 study published by NATO, "The Canadian-Spanish 'Turbot War' of 1995 is an example of the numerous international disputes that have arisen in recent decades over harvesting fish in the oceans. Spanish fishermen ram and slash the nets of French tuna boats in the Bay of Biscay; Russian warships conduct manoeuvres to prevent factory ships from Poland, China and South Korea from harvesting pollack and other depleted species in the

⁵³ <https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/>

⁵⁴ <http://www.u3o8.biz/s/MarketCommentary.asp?ReportID=754347& Title=10-Top-Uranium-producing-Countries>

⁵⁵ <https://www.mining-technology.com/features/featureradioactive-riches-the-five-biggest-uranium-rich-countries-4274059/>

⁵⁶ <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/list-of-countries-by-thorium-reserves.html>

⁵⁷ <https://news.stanford.edu/news/2006/november8/ocean-110806.html>

⁵⁸ <http://www.pnas.org/content/108/20/8317>

Sea of Okhotsk off eastern Siberia; Norwegian coast guard boats cut the nets of Icelandic fishing boats and fire warning shots in contested waters off Spitsbergen; Argentine naval boats confront a Taiwanese vessel fishing for squid and chase it across the entire Atlantic to South Africa; and warships from France and the United Kingdom face off over rights to fish around the islands of Guernsey and Sark in the English Channel.”⁵⁹

- The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand represent sustainable fishing practices, in stark contrast with EU factory vessels from Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Poland, or those from countries such as China. Which is also one of the reasons why a large section of the British fishing fleet declared itself Canadian during the Turbot War.
 - Independently of this, one of the US Government’s senior agricultural scientists has warned “The world is less than 40 years away from a food shortage that will have serious implications for people and governments”.⁶⁰
 - In this context it is noteworthy that Canada and Australia are among the world’s breadbaskets: they, along with a couple of other countries such as the United States and Russia, are suppliers of a large proportion of the world’s exported grains.⁶¹ (It is important to distinguish between exporters by economic *value* of food versus exporters by *quantities of staples* such as grain: it is the latter that means the difference between being fed and going hungry. It is also important to distinguish between exporters with a small, affluent population base—countries who may be expected to be able to continue exporting even in the presence of a parallel food supply disruption such as fisheries decline or collapse—and a grain exporter like the EU, which is itself fragile to food-supply disruptions due to its own large population.)
- **Global Positioning:**
 - **Diversification of global assets in the fight against terrorism and cyber-warfare:** Apart from possessing particular capabilities in their armed forces, the CANZ countries also have strategic value purely by virtue of their geography. This has always been an

⁵⁹ M.S. Soroos, “The Turbot War: Resolution of an International Fishery Dispute”, *Conflict and the Environment*, NATO Scientific Affairs Division (1997), pp.235-236.

⁶⁰ <https://aglifesciences.tamu.edu/blog/2014/04/23/food-shortages-could-be-most-critical-world-issue-by-mid-century/>

⁶¹ <http://www.worldstopexports.com/wheat-exports-country/>

important part of the Five Eyes defence arrangements, enabling efficient collection of global electronic signals intelligence. However in the 21st Century, as well as this “passive” form of military activity, two more “active” geographical capabilities have emerged:

- Regional intervention in the fight against terrorism and associated arms-trafficking and money-laundering activities. Australia has a particular relevance here with respect to Islamist groups, given its proximity to Indonesia and Malaysia;
 - As potential “bases” in cyberspace, in potential cyber warfare. The CANZ countries are all technologically advanced, with state-of-the-art computing resources. They represent friendly nodes in cyberspace geographically distant from the United Kingdom. This distance can be an asset, when out-flanking various forms of hostile cyber attack on the UK network and launching counter-attacks.
- **Space Bases and Testing Ranges:** A defining feature of the 21st Century is the renewed race for space.
- When the UK first put its Prospero satellite into orbit in 1971, this was launched from the Woomera testing range in Australia.
 - As of July 2018 the UK has declared⁶² it is building a vertical launch spaceport in Sutherland, Scotland and horizontal launch sites elsewhere across the UK.
 - In 2018 New Zealand successfully demonstrated⁶³ a commercial vertical-launch capability for small rockets.
 - In related technologies, the Australian HyShot project achieved successful tests demonstrating supersonic combustion and hypersonic capabilities,⁶⁴ including the world’s first successful flight of a scramjet engine.⁶⁵ The HyCAUSE and HIFiRE programmes were then established between the Defence Science and Technology Organisation and the US Air Force Research Laboratories; HIFiRE successfully flew a hypersonic waverider glider and

⁶² <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-space-agency>

⁶³ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-22/new-zealand-successfully-launches-first-rocket-into-space/9347886>

⁶⁴ <http://hypersonics.mechmining.uq.edu.au/hyshot-about>

⁶⁵ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HyShot>

subsequently tested a free-flying hypersonic scramjet designed by QinetiQ.⁶⁶

- Although the UK and New Zealand have established vertical-launch capabilities, additional benefits exist in being able to perform near-equatorial launches from Australian territory.
 - In addition the RAAF Woomera Range Complex in the middle of the South Australian desert enables secret testing of rockets, missiles and related technologies far away from unfriendly eyes. RAAF Woomera was originally the Anglo-Australian Long Range Weapons Establishment: in the 1950 and 1960s, the second-busiest test facility in the world, behind Cape Canaveral. By the late 1990s “the Woomera Test Range was the only land-based test range left in the Western world capable of testing the next (or what is now termed '5th') generation of weapons systems within a fully instrumented, land-based, specialized test and evaluation range”.⁶⁷
 - Until 1999, the US and Australia jointly operated the Joint Defence Facility Nurrungar in South Australia, a listening post using American geostationary satellites for space-based surveillance of potential hostile missile launches.
- **Other Strategic Technologies:**
- A handful of emerging technologies in the 21st Century will have strategic importance across the rest of the century. The combination of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Robotics and the Internet of Things has given rise to what is already being described as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”. Quantum computing will revolutionise computing capabilities, once existing problems of noise and scale are resolved. And new physical materials such as graphene offer extraordinary properties and new capabilities.
 - While the United Kingdom has a globally strong position in graphene R&D, other technologies are being developed independently across the world. China, the US and Russia are in a technological race for dominance in AI, with Putin declaring in September 2017 “Artificial intelligence is the future not only of Russia but of all of mankind ... Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”⁶⁸ Both the UK and Canada have independently

⁶⁶ <http://hypersonics.mechmining.uq.edu.au/hifire>

⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAAF_Woomera_Range_Complex

⁶⁸ <https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world>

organised themselves, with both governments defining it as a strategic priority. The UK has some high-profile companies such as Google DeepMind, while Canada has established AI hubs plus individual researchers such as Geoffrey Hinton, the British-born inventor of modern deep-learning neural networks. In Australia AI development is much more disorganised, but alternatives to neural networks have been privately developed.⁶⁹ Canada and Australia also both have world leaders in quantum computing, which promises (eventually) to transform both AI and encryption/code-breaking.

- Although channels already exist for communicating military applications of advanced technologies via TTCP, this is not currently a particularly effective way for CANZUK countries to access and share technologies of military significance developed outside of defence research organisations. A formal CANZUK alliance could be used to provide a basis for more efficient resourcing and sharing of capabilities generated by private sector and academic R&D, analogous to DARPA funding in the US.



⁶⁹ Full disclosure: one of the authors of this paper is a mathematical researcher in alternative forms of AI and is leader of one of the teams in the AI XPrize, the global race to re-define AI and its applications by 2020.

§Appendix 2: The Trajectory Downwards

Before addressing the positive steps for the future, one must first examine the lasting damage done by the pro-Europe policies of Harold Wilson and Edward Heath to the previous Commonwealth relationships with Britain.

In the late 1960s, when the United Kingdom under Wilson first began its policy of withdrawing from its commitments East of Suez, the relationship with Australia and New Zealand had been so close that no formal alliance was deemed necessary. Despite being fully-independent countries, until the late 1960s the armed forces of Australia and New Zealand had still used the Royal Navy White Ensign and Royal Air Force Ensign for their formal insignia and the British Union Flag for regimental standards. Military personnel moved freely among the three countries, and recent Commonwealth military actions involving the armed forces of all three—the Malayan Emergency and the Confrontation with Indonesia (*Konfrontasi*)—had been won. As the declassified Cabinet papers from the era reveal, Wilson’s sudden decision to withdraw from East of Suez was greeted with bewilderment, consternation and dismay across the Commonwealth.

In 1968 the Vietnam War was raging, involving 17 countries; the violent purges and civil conflict of the Cultural Revolution were in full force in Communist China. The Khmer Rouge had just emerged in Cambodia (and would take over in 1975) while Laos, in a state of civil war, was being heavily bombed as the Vietnam conflict widened. Indonesia after Sukarno remained a potential military threat to Malaysia and Australia. And over everything hung the shadow of the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless a draw-down of British forces for defending the former colonies and protectorates that had become Malaysia and Singapore was accommodated by Australia and New Zealand, under what has become known as the Five Power Defence Arrangements, signed in 1971.⁷⁰ As noted at the time,⁷¹ the Five Power Arrangements are not formally a pact, let alone a formal alliance; they are best described as two clusters of diplomatic agreements tied together by the 1971 London agreement, whereby if Malaysia or Singapore were attacked by an external aggressor, the five powers (UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore) would consult one another immediately to decide a response. There was no actual commitment in the Agreement to respond militarily, although as a consequence of the Agreement the ANZUK military force was formed in Singapore in November 1971. Nor was there any mention of how an attack on Australia or New Zealand should be interpreted, in stark contrast with the 1951 ANZUS treaty Australia has (and New Zealand then had) with the United States.

Initially it was assumed that if Australia or New Zealand were attacked, the UK would as a matter of course assist two of its oldest and most loyal supporters, so

⁷⁰ This was less incongruous than it might appear to a modern reader; in the late 1960s the Royal Australian Navy still possessed two aircraft carrier groups.

⁷¹ See e.g. Chin Kin Wah, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA: Some Observations on the Nature of an Evolving Partnership”, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (1974).

no text was needed; but in the early 1970s Prime Ministers Heath and Wilson rudely shattered this illusion, and in doing so, damaged the United Kingdom's global credibility.

Before becoming prime minister, Edward Heath had delivered lectures at Harvard University in 1967 in which he had declared that Europe, not the Commonwealth or the United States, offered the only way forward for Britain. Upon becoming prime minister in 1970 Heath adhered to his belief that "Britain's rulers cannot ride two horses at once", actively downgrading US relations in favour of Europe, and disregarding the Commonwealth entirely.

A positive attempt at spin on Heath's view was that, in the post-colonial form of the "Special Relationship" between the UK and US, the modern benefits brought by the UK to the alliance would be by exercising its supposedly superior influence within Europe to comply with American objectives, rather than within the Commonwealth. This narrative has been repeated across the decades, most recently by the "Remainers" campaigning against the Brexit Referendum. Even President Barack Obama gave it lip service during the Referendum, presumably assuming he'd get credit for backing the horse that was going to win anyway. And yet it has been repeatedly called out as a self-serving myth by successive generations of senior American figures. Henry Kissinger ridiculed it, asking in the 1960s:

*Do the Dutch inevitably feel a greater sense of identification with the French, or the British with the Germans, than either does with the United States?*⁷²

In 1973 he went further as US Secretary of State, informing the British ambassador to Washington that the "Special Relationship" was collapsing, as EEC entry "had caused Britain to sink to the level of their fellow West Europeans", a cohort Kissinger even described to Mao Tse Tung as "basically irrelevant".⁷³

When in 1974 Wilson replaced Heath as Prime Minister again, things got worse. That same year Prime Minister Wilson told his Australian counterpart Gough Whitlam that defence of Asia was not among "things we must do... [and the] 1968 decision [to withdraw forces from South East Asia] should now be carried out".⁷⁴ The ANZUK force was disbanded in 1974 and the UK aspects of the Five Power Agreement came to be regarded for a while as effectively a dead letter, as indeed were the UK's earlier commitments to the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEATO).

It is important to remember that exactly sixty years earlier, Australia and New Zealand had been plunged into the global catastrophe of World War I as part of the British Empire. At the time the Australian Prime Minister had declared "should the worst happen [and war break out], after everything has been done

⁷² Hughes R.G., Robb T., "Kissinger and the Diplomacy of Coercive Linkage in the 'Special Relationship' between the United States and Great Britain, 1969–1977", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 37(4), (1 September 2013), pp. 861–905

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

that honour will permit, Australians will stand beside the mother country to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling".⁷⁵ Unlike the United Kingdom, Australia had immediately engaged in warfare: probably the first combat anywhere in the world between forces loyal to the British and German Crowns was by Australian forces fighting against their imperial German counterparts in the jungles of what is now Papua New Guinea. Raiding ships of the Imperial German Navy's East Asia squadron swept down from their Chinese moorings to attack British merchant shipping in the region, with the SMS *Emden* sunk by HMAS *Sydney* in early November 1914. Australian and New Zealand soldiers served effectively as Imperial shock troops across the rest of the war, most notably at Gallipoli and on the Western Front.

And thirty-three years before Wilson's meeting with Whitlam, in 1941 Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Newfoundland had stood again beside the United Kingdom under Sir Winston Churchill and risked their own immediate extinction. There was no constitutional requirement to do so:⁷⁶ Commonwealth Dominions could have remained neutral (as the Irish Free State did, and as the Union of South Africa briefly contemplated doing), but at a time when the United States was firmly neutral, assuming the United Kingdom would survive only two weeks before being conquered by the Third Reich, these Commonwealth countries chose to stand and fight. In Britain's "finest hour", Commonwealth pilots made a substantial contribution in defending the UK. As well as the ordinary pilots who fought and died in the Battle of Britain, one of the most senior RAF commanders was a New Zealander, Air Vice Marshal Park, whom the Germans called "the Defender of London".⁷⁷ A significant proportion of the Dambusters' flight crews were Canadian or Australian. And when the British Eighth Army defeated Rommel's Afrika Korps in the two Battles of El Alamein, Commonwealth forces played a pivotal role.

Heath's and Wilson's positions were (and still are) regarded as deeply dishonourable, a betrayal of this sacrifice, further compounded by the economic damage done by Britain's entry into the EEC. It is not a coincidence that the enraged Parliaments of Australia and New Zealand struck off some of the symbols previously held in common with Britain. In the period 1973-75, the titles of Queen Elizabeth II as Queen of Australia⁷⁸ and Queen of New Zealand⁷⁹ were changed so as to erase the previous references to the United Kingdom—her own commitment to the Commonwealth was recognised, along with its absence from her British Prime Ministers. This parliamentary anger echoed that of the wider public, an anger and bitterness that rankle to this day.

⁷⁵ https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1415/AustToWar1914

⁷⁶ For discussion see Greenwood, N.J.C., *For the Sovereignty of the People*, Australian Academic Press (1999).

⁷⁷ <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/4284451/United-in-praise-of-The-Defender-of-London.html>

⁷⁸ *Royal Style and Titles Act (1973)*

⁷⁹ *Royal Titles Act (1974)*

It should be understood that Washington was always aware of all this. The “Special Relationship” has always been rather more crowded than Whitehall realises, and at this time both the Australian and New Zealand armed forces were fighting alongside the US in Vietnam, the war to which Wilson famously refused to commit even “a platoon of bagpipers”.

US President Lyndon Johnson thought Britain’s worldwide military withdrawal under Wilson was an indication that “the ramparts of the Free World” would now have to be defended solely by the US, and viewed Britain as having simply abandoned its global military commitments. By 1975 senior American political, diplomatic and military figures were openly expressing contempt for UK political will or relevance.⁸⁰

From the American perspective, the silver lining was that the British abandonment left a global vacancy to be filled: not just in military terms, but in political and cultural terms as well. For the rest of the Cold War the United States was able to reposition itself as the sole effective defender of the wider English-speaking world; a position it has continued to assert until the beginning of the Trump presidency.

This American position has been underlined by decades of British neglect of the Commonwealth. For example, when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Australia in 1989 it was the first full-scale visit by any British Prime Minister to the region since Macmillan’s 1957 visit.⁸¹ Contrast this with the fact that of the nine Presidents of the United States from Lyndon Johnson (1966) to Barack Obama (2014), five have managed at least one state visit, a tradition begun by Johnson in gratitude for support in Vietnam.⁸²

And yet even when British-Australian relations were at their relative nadir, it is worth remembering that Australia was still regarded as the ultimate safe haven for any Royal Navy submarines that would survive a nuclear war. One of the British Prime Ministers’ duties, first arising during the Cold War and continuing to this day, is to write “Letters of Last Resort”—the final orders given to the nuclear-armed RN submarines in the event of a nuclear holocaust, including instructions as to what these submarines should do if they have survived a war that has destroyed the United Kingdom. The *Guardian* reported that one of the standard options is “Go to Australia”.⁸³ Quite how Heath and Wilson reconciled this with the effects of their own policies is an interesting question.

So when the British Secretary of State for Defence now declares, as Gavin Williamson declared in July 2018,

⁸⁰ Hughes R.G., Robb T., *op cit*.

⁸¹ Lord Brabazon of Tara, “1988-89: A Watershed in Britain/Australia Relations”, *The Round Table* (1990), 313 pp.34-38.

⁸² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_visits_to_Australia_and_New_Zealand

⁸³ <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/12/theresa-mays-first-job-decide-on-uks-nuclear-response>

“We are hoping on deploying HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Pacific and sailing side-by-side with Australian vessels...we make to make sure everyone around the world understands that these two great nations are the greatest of allies”⁸⁴

this is greatly to be applauded, but has a bitter backdrop that cannot be ignored. If we are to ensure that “everyone around the world” understand that Britain and Australia—and Canada and New Zealand—are the greatest of allies, then more must be done.

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⁸⁴ *The Australian*, 21 July 2018.

§Appendix 3: The Trajectory Turns Upwards

It was, of all things, an unexpected war in 1982 that transformed the previous decade's diplomatic and military quagmire.

In April 1982 Argentinian forces mounted a surprise attack on the British Falkland Islands, swiftly over-running the British defences. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher resolved to recapture the Falklands, by military force if necessary. Her response startled the rest of the world, although the contrast in reaction between Commonwealth countries and Britain's "friends and partners" in the EEC is significant.

Support for Britain among the European governments was mixed at best, for the most part amounting to economic sanctions against Argentina. Indeed France, while providing intelligence and resources to the UK and appearing supportive at the United Nations, kept a technical team in the occupied Falklands throughout the war. This team assisted the Argentinians with crucial Exocet repairs that enabled attacks against British forces.⁸⁵ Other European governments clearly sympathised with Argentina and were opposed to any attempts by the UK to retake the Falklands. Further afield, Israel openly supported Argentina, resupplying it with weapons and equipment during the war.⁸⁶

The Commonwealth—in particular its Secretary General Sir Shridath Ramphal and the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Kenya, Guyana and the Caribbean countries—reacted very differently. Despite acrimony over the lasting damage done to their economies by Britain's entry into the EEC, they were swift to offer support. In particular Sir Shridath Ramphal and New Zealand Prime Minister Sir Robert Muldoon provided a coordinated and formidable lobby on the floor of the United Nations, rallying and sustaining Commonwealth support for Britain at the UN, against many of the Latin American countries.

Muldoon, by chance in London at the time the Falklands War began, had immediately offered his support to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The immediate effect was to free up a warship from the Royal Navy's Indian Ocean Task Group so it could be dispatched to the South Atlantic, by replacing the HMS *Amazon* in the Indian Ocean with the HMNZS *Canterbury* and HMNZS *Waikato*. At the time it was conjectured that the most likely form any further support would take would be provision of a New Zealand home for the Falkland Islanders in the eventuality of a British defeat. However, later in the war when the HMS *Sheffield* had been sunk, Muldoon secretly approved the dispatch of the Royal New Zealand Navy *Leander* class frigate, the HMNZS *Canterbury*, to the South Atlantic in an initially non-combat support role to the British taskforce. This provoked a furore in the New Zealand parliament, although Muldoon got his

⁸⁵ Thomson, Mike, "How France helped both sides in the Falklands War", *BBC* (5 March 2012); <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17256975>

⁸⁶ <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/23/israel-sold-weapons-to-argentina-at-height-of-falklands-war-reve/>

way.⁸⁷ (The offer was eventually politely declined, due to the absence of appropriate upgrades to radar and countermeasures on the ship; instead the *Canterbury* was sent to the Persian Gulf to free up a more modern Royal Navy frigate squadron, which could then be sent to the Falklands.)

Australia also actively threw its support behind the UK. For Britain to contemplate retaking the Falklands, the naval taskforce would need to employ the aircraft carrier HMS *Invincible*. The problem was, under a February 1982 agreement the *Invincible* had been contracted to be sold to the Royal Australian Navy as the re-badged HMAS *Australia*. This created a headache in terms of sending it into battle, potentially leaving the proposed Royal Navy taskforce without critical capability. So as part of its contribution the Australian government quietly agreed to tear up the contract if need be (a decision communicated more formally later, on 1 June), freeing the *Invincible* for taskforce deployment and subsequent protection of the Falklands.⁸⁸

Like Muldoon at the UN, the Australian government also swung into action diplomatically. As luck would have it, in 1982 both Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and Defence Minister Sir James Killen had, in their earlier careers, served as Australian cabinet ministers with military portfolios during the Vietnam War and the disastrous British abandonment of the late 1960s and 1970s. Fraser had served as Minister for the Army (1966-1968) and Minister for Defence (1969-1971), while Killen had served as Minister for the Navy (1969-1971) and had served as Minister for Defence since 1975. Which meant that in 1982 Killen was the longest-serving defence minister in the Western Alliance, with good working relationships with senior military and intelligence figures across the rest of the Alliance. In particular he was an old friend of the former Director of the CIA and now US Vice-President, George H.W. Bush.⁸⁹

In Thatcher's willingness to contemplate war to regain the Falklands, Fraser and Killen saw at last a British Prime Minister who would be a reliable ally. So they decided to try to persuade Washington to support her. Again fortune favoured them: at a time when senior figures in the Reagan administration were still ambivalent about the Falklands and had yet to decide their position, Bush was visiting Australia as Vice-President. He was scheduled to have dinner in Canberra with Fraser and Killen on the evening of 30 April 1982, the night before a crucial meeting of the US National Security Council (NSC) in Washington.

Two different accounts exist of that night. The thing they have in common is that Killen and Fraser pitched a strong case for American support of Britain in the war: Thatcher was the first British Prime Minister in twenty years to display a willingness to go to war for the British national interest, and this had to be

⁸⁷ *The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future* (ed. Stephen Badsey, Mark Grove and Rob Havers), Routledge (2004).

⁸⁸ Personal communication with Sir James Killen, Australian Minister of Defence at the time of the Falklands.

⁸⁹ Apart sharing a professional interest in military intelligence, they enjoyed a shared appreciation for racehorses—after retirement Killen ended up with a part-share in one of Bush's thoroughbred horses.

supported. If the Falklands War were lost, her own political position would be untenable and she would lose office. The shock to the British psyche of a defeat in the Falklands would be conceivably worse than that of Suez. Whoever would replace Thatcher would be almost certainly isolationist and an appeaser,⁹⁰ worse than either Heath or Wilson. Under those circumstances, America could probably forget about Britain as a European site for the NATO nuclear deterrent, or as an ally in the Cold War.

Bush, visibly shaken, asked to make an urgent phone call to Washington that night. The content of that call is unknown, but the US NSC meeting of the morning of 30 April 1982 (on the other side of the International Date Line, some hours later) voted in favour of supporting the UK, against the advice of the US ambassador to the UN, who vigorously advocated neutrality.

One account of that night was in Fraser's memoirs published in 2010,⁹¹ in which he claims to have done the talking at the dinner. Some details of his account are faulty and have been criticised—not least his assertion that Bush's call was during the dinner, directly to the NSC meeting, despite the fact that the dinner ended at 7pm, or 5am in Washington. This, along with the fact Fraser had never mentioned these events before and the NSC minutes don't mention a call, led some to question whether it had actually happened.⁹² However a second, separate account exists: that of Sir James Killen, who in the 1990s privately also recounted the events of that night⁹³ (and who, perhaps not coincidentally for the timing of Fraser's memoir, had died in 2007). In Killen's version of events—more nuanced than Fraser's rather facile account—the conversation happened between himself and Bush, and happened privately over a glass of Scotch, not at the dinner itself. Fraser's involvement in the conversation was limited, at the end of Killen's pitch, when he entered the room and briefly confirmed Killen's assessment to the deeply shocked Bush. In Killen's account, the recipient of Bush's urgent phone call was unknown but relevant to the NSC deliberations. And Killen never claimed that the conversation alone swung the NSC's decision, merely that it obviously persuaded Bush and certainly would have helped the outcome along.

Yes, Reagan and Thatcher had a special relationship, which also would have helped the NSC decision on the Falklands. But the Special Relationship has often been remarkably crowded, augmented by other countries who also have a "special relationship" with the US and its key figures, and have used this quietly to support Britain's position.

So, despite their well-justified anger at the policies of successive British governments, when the UK found itself at war the Commonwealth in general,

⁹⁰ Their pessimism is supported by the Cabinet Papers declassified in 2012, which show that at least one of Thatcher's senior Cabinet colleagues—and a likely alternative leadership candidate, were she to lose the leadership—actively favoured appeasing Argentina.

⁹¹ *Malcolm Fraser: The Political Memoirs*, Melbourne University Press (2010), pp.482-483.

⁹² <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/among-the-unlisted-falklands-casualties-one-malcolm-fraser-20121231-2c2l9.html>

⁹³ Personal communication with Sir James Killen.

and Australia and New Zealand in particular, did all they could to help. A contract was quietly torn up to ensure the HMS *Invincible* was available to fight and remain at the Falklands as long as needed; defence arrangements were reorganised to free up another Royal Navy warship from the Indian Ocean, to enable its deployment in the Falklands Task Force; when the HMS *Sheffield* was sunk, a frigate was offered to be sent in reserve, and was sent instead to the Persian Gulf to free up Royal Navy frigates; on the floor of the United Nations, Commonwealth support was rallied to give the UK the support it needed; and the United States was independently warned to support the British effort properly or else risk endangering the Cold War balance of power.

Memo to Whitehall: this is what Britain's actual "friends and partners" look like.

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§Appendix 4: A New Commonwealth Relationship

This idea has been evolving for decades. One of the striking features of the post-Falklands Thatcher government was the renewed interest in the Commonwealth. In 1989, as part of the first full-scale visit to Australia by a British Prime Minister since 1957, Margaret Thatcher advocated a trading, investment, political and diplomatic renaissance between Australia and Britain, declaring:

*We want to step up our contacts at every level with Australia, including more regular ministerial visits... let us increase our contacts as two strong, proud, independent successful nations each with its own specific contribution to make.*⁹⁴

Thatcher's Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Brabazon of Tara, argued that mutual advantage lay in this renaissance for both countries:

*[F]or Britain, the advantage of a close partnership with a stable, friendly, like-minded country situated near the fast developing Asian Pacific Rim; for Australia, the advantage of having a leading member of the Western alliance and the European Community as interlocuteur.*⁹⁵

An even stronger case than Brabazon's for pursuit of this political and trading axis was provided by Katherine West at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. Even at the height of pro-European fervour in the 1990s, the bulk of British trade was going elsewhere. In 1994 West noted that, despite the political rhetoric favouring Europe,

*[T]he balance of British trade is already tilting heavily away from Europe. Indeed the Oxford Economic Forecasting Group claims Britain's trade with China and the Pacific Rim economies will double well before the end of the century, outstripping the US as a market for British goods. According to the British financial journalist Bill Jamieson, many leading British companies—such as GEC, P&O, Courtalds, Johnson Matthey, Trafalgar, and BOC Group—expect that, by the end of the century, the China and Pacific Rim economies will account for between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of their company turnover.*⁹⁶

At the time she noted that across the previous decade more than three-quarters of British direct investment and an even greater proportion of its portfolio investment had been invested outside the European Community (EC), and remarked on the important difference between “visible” exports and actual exports: even in 1992, the year of Maastricht, although 56% of Britain's visible

⁹⁴ Lord Brabazon of Tara, “1988-89: A Watershed in Britain/Australia Relations”, *The Round Table* (1990), 313 pp.34-38; this quote p.35.

⁹⁵ *Ibid* p.36.

⁹⁶ *The Financial Times*, 24th January 1994; see also West K., “Britain, the Commonwealth and the Global Economy”, *The Round Table* (1994), 332 pp.407-417; this quote p.410.

exports went to EC countries, only 45% of total British exports actually went there. The rest went to the wider world beyond Europe.⁹⁷

Across the decades to 2016 this European proportion of British exports has continued to decline,⁹⁸ giving new emphasis to West's declaration "While Britain's political face remains turned to Europe, its economic feet are striding elsewhere, notably to the Asia-Pacific region".⁹⁹

West argued that British companies would employ traditional Commonwealth links—in particular Australia—to pursue this agenda, because of a shared "Commonwealth business culture" based on shared English language, legal, administrative, accountancy and financial practices, following Professor Samuel Huntington's adage that "close economic cooperation normally requires a common cultural base".¹⁰⁰

Brexit now enables Britain's political face to follow its economic and military interests, across the open sea.



⁹⁷ West, *op. cit.* pp.408-409.

⁹⁸ <https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-eu-trade/>

⁹⁹ West, *op. cit.* pp.408-409.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid* p.412

About CANZUK International

CANZUK International is a non-profit organisation advocating closer diplomatic ties between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (the CANZUK countries).

Founded in January 2015, we have campaigned for greater social, economic and diplomatic cooperation between the CANZUK countries with significant public, organisational and political support. Today, we comprise of staff in all four CANZUK countries dedicated to advancing facilitated migration, free trade, coordinated foreign policy and security cooperation between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

Our work has been featured in mainstream media across the world, and our online petition advocating facilitated migration between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom has received nearly quarter of a million signatures.

Furthermore, we engage with international policy institutes, think tanks and non-governmental organisations to develop our proposals, and frequently host senior members of parliament and diplomats for discussion regarding the CANZUK initiative.

For more information, please contact:

James Skinner

Chief Executive - Vancouver, Canada

Email: james@canzukinternational.com

John Bender

Chairman - London, United Kingdom

Email: jbender@canzukinternational.com

Dr. Nigel Greenwood

Director - Brisbane, Australia

Email: nigel@canzukinternational.com

Noel Cox

Adviser - Auckland, New Zealand

Email: noel@canzukinternational.com

Further information can also be found via our website at www.canzukinternational.com

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